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I. INTRODUCTION
It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice
against itself in favor of its citizens as it is to administer the
same between private individuals.'
In January of 1978, the West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources ("WV DHHR") 2 received a report that twelve-year-old Kimberly
I Abraham Lincoln, First Annual State of the Union Message (Dec. 3, 1861).
2 See W. VA. CODE, § 49-2B-1 (1996) (granting WV DHHR the responsibility to protect the
state's foster children).
1
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Merrill had been sexually abused by her father.3 Kimberly declined to disclose
the details of this abuse, because the social worker assigned to investigate the
allegations never interviewed Kimberly outside of the presence of her sexually
abusive father.4 Though Kimberly's father admitted to forcing Kimberly to pose
for a series of nude photographs, WV DHHR declined to take any action on
Kimberly's behalf until July of 1982, following a subsequent report of sexual
abuse.6 During the four and a half-year period between January of 1978 and
July of 1982, Kimberly "endured regular sexual abuse from her father."
7
Kimberly Merrill's situation, while tragic, is far from unique. After be-
ing sexually abused by her father, Teresa Mayfield was removed from her home
in 1984 and placed in foster care.8 In August of 1985, following an "improve-
ment period," WV DHHR returned Teresa to her parents' home.9 Teresa soon
reported the abuse had resumed, but incredibly, WV DHHR did not remove her
from the home. 10 On her eighteenth birthday, Teresa received medical treatment
for the injuries she sustained in her second suicide attempt, while WV DHHR,
no longer responsible for protecting her, closed her file.1
In a separate case, a Kanawha County child was killed after being
placed back in the custody of an abusive parent.' 2 In yet another case, five-day-
old Jonathan Coffman froze to death in his unheated home. 13 The social worker
assigned to supervise Jonathan and his mentally handicapped mother knew that
the Coffman home had no heat, but took no action.' 4 In another case, a twenty-
nine-day-old boy was taken to the hospital with a broken arm.15 Though physi-
cal abuse was suspected, the WV DHHR social worker assigned to the case
permitted the child to return home with his parents. 6 Approximately one week
3 Merrill v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 632 S.E.2d 307, 310 (W. Va. 2006) (dis-
missed for failing to comply with the statute of limitations).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 310; see also Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 21-22, Merrill v. W. Va. Dep't of Health
& Human Resources, No. 32856 (W. Va. Oct. 19, 2005).
6 Merrill, at 310.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 317. Ms. Mayfield's case, which was adjudicated in the same opinion as Ms. Merrill's,
was dismissed for failure to comply with the statute of limitations.
9 Id.; see also Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 21-22, Merrill v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and
Human Res., No. 32856 (W. Va. Oct. 19, 2005).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res. v. Kaufman, 506 S.E.2d 93, 94 (W. Va. 1998).
13 Michelle Saxton, State Settles Lawsuit for $850,000, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 20,
2005, at D6.
14 Id.
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later, the boy, just over one month old, had been beaten so severely that he suf-
fered permanent brain damage, blindness, physical deformity, and mental retar-
dation.
17
The abuse that Kimberly Merrill, Teresa Mayfield, Jonathan Coffman,
and the unnamed minors in the cases detailed above-as well as the incompe-
tence and callousness that these young victims encountered in their interactions
with WV DHHR-reflect a larger pattern in America's child welfare system,
particularly within the foster care system.' 8 It is impossible to pinpoint the exact
number of foster children in America who have been or are abused 19 or ne-
glected,20 because many-if not most--cases likely go unreported.2 1 However,
in 1999, the United States Department of Health and Human Services reported
that the rate of child maltreatment in foster care was more than seventy-five
percent higher than in the general population.22 The same study concluded that
the mortality rate for foster children resulting from maltreatment was almost
350% higher than the mortality rate resulting from maltreatment among children
17 Id.
18 It also appears that foster children are more likely to be neglected than children in the gen-
eral population, though the evidence on this front is largely antidotal. Kurt Mundorff, Children as
Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform Child Welfare, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y
& ETHIcs J. 131, 160 (2003). One commentator, for example, reported in a recent study that fos-
ter children are typically given cheaper food and clothing than biological children, restricted to
certain areas of the house, and sometimes forbidden to open the refrigerator or watch television
with the biological family. Id. Another commentator expressed concern that foster children often
do not receive proper medical or psychiatric attention. Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of
Foster Care Reform: Revolutionizing the Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 1, 7 (1995). It is, however, common for foster parents to seek medication to ease the bur-
den of "controlling" their foster children. Mundorff, supra note 1, at 160.
19 See W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3(a) (1977) ("'Abused child' means a child whose health or wel-
fare is harmed or threatened by: (1) A parent, guardian or custodian who knowingly or intention-
ally inflicts, attempts to inflict or knowingly allows another person to inflict, physical injury or
mental or emotional injury, upon the child or another child in the home; or (2) Sexual abuse or
sexual exploitation; or (3) The sale or attempted sale of a child by a parent, guardian or custodian
in violation of section sixteen, article four, chapter forty-eight of this code; or (4) Domestic vio-
lence as defined in section two hundred two, article twenty-seven, chapter forty-eight of this
code.").
20 See W. VA. CODE § 49-1-30) (1977) ('"Neglected child' means a child: (A) Whose physical
or mental health is harmed or threatened by a present refusal, failure or inability of the child's
parent, guardian or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervi-
sion, medical care or education, when such refusal, failure or inability is not due primarily to a
lack of financial means on the part of the parent, guardian or custodian; or (B) Who is presently
without necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education or supervision because of the
disappearance or absence of the child's parent or custodian").
21 Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: the Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Chil-
dren from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 199, 205 (1988).
22 Sharon Balmer, From Poverty to Abuse and Back Again: the Failure of Social Service
Agencies to Protect Foster Children, 32 FORDHAm URB. L.J. 935, 938 (Sept. 2005) (citing Barbara
E. Handschu, NEw YORK CIvEL PRACTICE: FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS § 46.04(c) (2005)).
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23in the general population. Additionally, the rate of sexual abuse is four times
higher for children in foster care than for children in the general population.
24
At least one cause of the higher rates of abuse that foster children suffer
is easy to pinpoint: foster children are often placed into homes without adequate
investigation of the home beforehand, and without adequate supervision of the
foster family after the placement is made. 25 As a result, an estimated forty-three
percent of all foster children live in "unsuitable" foster homes, and fifty-seven
percent are at risk of harm in foster care.26
WV DHHR does not maintain a database which tracks abuse and ne-
glect rates within West Virginia's foster care system, but the agency's failure to
intervene on behalf of abused and neglected children is well documented. A
2004 review conducted by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services rated West Virginia's response to reports of child abuse and neglect
among the worst in the nation.27 Thus, it is not surprising that the rate of child
abuse and neglect in West Virginia is also among the worst in the nation.28 In
2005, the most recent year for which statistics are available, West Virginia at-
tributed sixteen child deaths to abuse or neglect in 2005, a rate of 4.18 fatalities
per 100,000 children,29 the second highest rate in the nation and more than twice
the national average.30  These statistics, combined with harrowing anecdotal
evidence, 31 indicate a systemic failure on WV DHHR's part to adequately per-
23 Id.
24 Id. at 938 (citing Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: the
Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L & SOC. CHANGE 1, 7 (1999)). One
commentator has suggested that this statistic can be attributed to the fact that "the incest taboo
does not apply within the foster family structure." See Mushlin, supra note 21, at 205.
25 Mushlin, supra note 21, at 209-11.
26 Susan Lynn Abbott, Liability of the State and its Employees for the Negligent Investigation
of Child Abuse Reports, 10 ALASKA L. REv. 401, 401-402 (1993) ("[t]ens of thousands of...
children" have been seriously injured while under the protection of a social service agency.)
27 Dawn Miller, West Virginia's Child-Abuse Solution Not Working, CHARLESTON GAZETrE,
Nov. 6, 2004, at A4 ("West Virginia... flunked miserably on a federal review of how it responds
to complaints of child abuse and neglect.").
28 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CHILD WELFARE OuTcOMES 2003: ANN. REP., ch.
VI, W. Va. (2003) available at http://www.ocf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo03/index.htm
[hereinafter Child Welfare Outcomes].
29 Jake Stump, Child Abuse Deaths High in West Virginia, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 18,
2007, at IA.
30 Id. (Oklahoma reported the nation's worst fatality rate, with 4.80 abuse or neglect related
deaths per 100,000 children).
31 See, e.g., Andrew Clevenger, Doctor, Wife Charged With Child Neglect; Couples Son Faces
Trial in Logan Goodall's Death, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 2007, at IA (deceased child's
father sues WV DHHR after the agency allegedly failed to respond to his repeated reports that
mother and step-father burned his two-year-old son's heels, buttocks, and testicles; child was
subsequently sexually abused and murdered); Associated Press, DHHR Sued Over Boy's Alleged
Abuse, CHARLESTON GAzETrE, Aug. 13, 2005, A6 (father sues WV DHHR for failing to respond
to his repeated reports that his son suffered sexual abuse at the hands of mother's live-in boy-
[Vol. I111
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form its statutory duty to protect abused and neglected children after the abuse
has been reported to the agency.32
Children in the general population - that is, those not residing in foster
care - are significantly less likely to find justice after social worker negligence
results in their abuse or neglect, because it is well established that the state has
no duty to protect a child from abuse or neglect perpetrated by the child's par-
ents.33 Thus, a discussion of the limited legal remedies available to children in
the general population for damages that result from WV DHHR's negligence is
beyond the scope of this article.
Rather, this Note focuses on the legal claim that a foster child may have
to seek redress for abuse and neglect that results from WV DHHR's negligent
placement of the child in an unsuitable foster home, negligent supervision of the
child after his or her foster care placement, or negligent investigation of a report
of foster child abuse or neglect.
This Note will describe the expensive tortuous path a foster child must
follow in order to litigate such a claim on its merits, and will recommend reform
in this inequitable and overly complicated area of the law. This Note begins, in
Part II, with a description of the law that governs WV DHHR's placement and
supervision of foster children. Part 1I of this Note describes that first hurdle an
abused or neglected foster child must overcome prior to litigating a negligence
claim against WV DHHR: establishing the existence of a legal duty of protec-
tion owed by WV DHHR to the state's foster children. Part IV describes the
second pre-trial obstacle in such a claim: proving that the state's liability insur-
ance policy covers the negligence asserted in the plaintiff-foster child's claim; in
the absence of such coverage, the plaintiff-foster child's claim will undoubtedly
be barred. Part V describes the immunities WV DHHR will likely assert in such
a claim, as well as the legal tactics a plaintiff-foster child may use to breach
these immunities. Part VI sets forth recommended common law and statutory
reforms which - if implemented - would decrease the likelihood that a negli-
gence suit filed by a foster child against WV DHHR will be dismissed on a
friend); Associated Press, Ravenswood Mom Sentenced in Baby Boy's Strangulation,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 13, 2004, at 1 A (neighbor allegedly reported to WV DHHR that 15-
month old boy was abused and neglected by his mother, but the agency did not investigate or
otherwise act on the report; child was subsequently strangled to death by mother; trial court states
that "[WV] DHHR failed this child .... "); Susan Williams, Mercer Man, DHHR Differ on Re-
sponse to Neglect Allegations, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 11, 2007, at A6 (director of nonprofit
group reports that WV DHHR did not respond to his repeated reports to the agency that three
minors were not adequately fed or clothed, and lacked access to running water).
32 In fact, studies conducted in several states reveal that "approximately twenty-five percent of
all child fatalities resulting from abuse or neglect occur after the abuse has been reported to a state
child protective agency." Abbott, supra note 26, at 401.
33 DeShaney v .Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.189, 193-95 (1989) (holding
that the state of Illinois had no duty to protect a child from "private violence" perpetrated by his
physically abusive father, though the state knew or should have known of the abuse).
2009]
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technicality, and would, in turn, better enable plaintiff-foster children to litigate
negligence claims on the merits.
HI. THE LAW AND WEST VIRGINIA'S FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
WV DHHR and its Child Protective Services ("CPS") workers are au-
thorized to take involuntary custody of abused and neglected children and pro-
vide them with a substitute,34 alternate home until the cause of the child's abuse
or neglect has been rectified. 35 When possible, a child will be placed with an-
other relative until he or she can safely return to his or her original home.36
When it is not possible to place an abused or neglected child with a relative, the
child will be placed in West Virginia's foster care system. 37 Over four thousand
children38 resided in West Virginia's three-hundred and eighty-four 9 licensed
foster care homes in 2003. 40 WV DHHR certifies each of these foster care
homes, insuring that prospective foster parents meet certain minimum eligibility
34 W. VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES., FOSTER CARE POL'Y § 1.4, (2008) available at
http://www.wvdhhr.org/bcf/children-adult/foster/policy.asp [hereinafter FOSTER CARE POLICY]
(stating that one of the three primary purposes of foster care is "[tlo reunite the child in foster care
with his family by providing services aimed at reunification whenever possible and when the
safety of the child can be assured.").
35 Id. at § 1.2.
36 Id. at § 1.7. A 2003 study concluded that "fifty-three percent of the young people leaving
the system in [fiscal year] 2003 were reunified with their birth parents or primary caregivers."
CHILD. BUREAU, U.S DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADOPTION & FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS &
REP. SURVEY, REP. #14,. (2006) [hereinafter "AFCARS"] available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov
/programs/cb/statsresearch /index.htm.
37 FOSTER CARE POLICY, supra note 34, at § 1.16. Technically, there are six different ways that
a child may enter the foster care system in West Virginia: (1) a parent may request that his or her
child be placed in the foster care system when there is a family crisis; (2) when the parent is un-
able to meet the child's physical or mental needs; (3) a child protective services worker may, in
accordance with section 49-6-3(c) of the West Virginia Code, take a child into emergency custody
and place him or her in the foster care system; (4) a "status offense" may bring the child to the
attention of juvenile court; (5) the child may be adjudicated as a delinquent for engaging in crimi-
nal behavior; and (6) a former foster care youth over the age of 18 may decide to continue living
as a foster child. Id
38 CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES, supra note 28.
39 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., NAT'L DATA ANALYSIS SYS., available at
http://ndas.cwla.org/data _stats/access/predefined/Report.asp?ReportlD= 127
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008). Additionally, there are nine "specialized foster care" providers lo-
cated in West Virginia. Specialized foster care providers are private - rather than state - entities
which provide care for children with "more intense service and treatment needs." S. Pires & G.
Silber, GEo. UNIV. CHILD DEv. CTR., More Precious Than Gold: Voices of Foster Children in
West Virginia, available at http://www.wvvoices.org/library-downloads/FosterCare-Report
2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). Such homes are "certified and monitored by the private
foster care provider agencies" and thus outside the scope of this Note. Id.
40 CHILD WELFARE OUtrcoMEs, supra note 28. In 2003, the average length of stay for children
in foster care in West Virginia was 12.8 months.
[Vol. I111
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Additionally, while children reside in foster care, WV DHHR
"[a]ssumes part or all of the responsibility [for these children] that ordinarily
rests with the parents. ' '42 Thus, in order to ensure that foster children remain
safe while they are in foster care, WV DHHR employs 520 CPS workers,43 who
are tasked with identifying threats to children, including the state's foster chil-
dren, and securing their safety.44 CPS workers are the "first responders" in the
state's child abuse prevention scheme. After WV DHHR receives a report that a
foster child has been abused or neglected, the report is screened-in, or assigned,
to a CPS worker who is tasked with the initial investigation of the report.4 5 WV
DHHR developed and, in 2006, promulgated a "Child Protective Services Pol-
icy," which sets specific standards for such investigations. 46 Under these stan-
dards, CPS workers must respond to and conduct initial investigations of reports
of abuse or neglect within two hours, 72 hours, or 14 days, depending on the
severity and urgency of the allegations contained in the report.4 7
Following the initial investigation, the CPS worker will complete an ini-
tial assessment and safety evaluation of the case.48 During this part of the proc-
ess, the CPS worker will conduct face-to-face interviews with the allegedly
abused or neglected foster child, the person who made the report, the alleged
"maltreator," and any other person who may be able to provide useful informa-
41 FOSTER CARE POLICY, supra note 34, at §14.2. Most of the eligibility criteria are objective.
Prospective foster parents, for example, must be 21 years of age, U.S. citizens, etc. However, the
Policy sets forth some subjective criteria as well, requiring, for example, that applicants be "nur-
turing, responsible, patient, stable, flexible, mature, healthy adults capable of meeting the individ-
ual needs of children referred for placement services."
42 Id. at § 1.7.
43 Kris Wise, Protective Services Caseload Criticized, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 30,
2007, at Al.
44 FOSTER CARE POLICY, supra note 34, at § 1.5. Additionally, a CPS worker may take emer-
gency custody of a child and place the child in foster care. W. VA. CODE 49-6-3(c) (1977).
45 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES., NAT'L STUDY OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERV. SYs. &
REFORM EFFORTS (Mar. 2001), http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/protective01/index.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2009).
46 See generally W. VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES
POL'Y (June 16, 2006) [hereinafter CPS POUCY], http://www.wvdhhr.org/bcf/childrenadult
/cps/policy/cpspolicy-june2006.doc.
47 CPS POLICY, supra note 46, at §2.4. In determining response time for accepted CPS intakes,
the supervisor must consider the presence of allegations of imminent danger to the physical well-
being of the child(ren) or of serious physical abuse. Id. The West Virginia Code requires the
same. See W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-9(4) (1999).
48 CPS POLICY, supra note 46, at § 3.1. ("Initial assessment of a report of child maltreatment
sets the stage for the problem validation, service provision, and the establishment of a helping
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tion regarding the case.4 9 The Child Protective Services Policy sets forth spe-
cific standards and lists certain concerns that CPS workers should inquire about
in these interviews.50 At the conclusion of the CPS worker's investigation, the
CPS worker and a CPS supervisor will develop a risk assessment for the case,5'
the goal of which is to determine whether the alleged abuse or neglect took
place and how likely such "maltreatment is to occur in the future., 52 Finally, the
CPS worker and CPS supervisor will make a decision as to whether the foster
child should remain in the home in which the alleged abuse or neglect took
place.53 If the CPS worker and supervisor determine that the child should re-
main in the home, they will develop a plan for future monitoring of the home.
54
If the CPS worker and CPS supervisor determine that the child is in "imminent
danger of serious bodily or emotional injury or death, 55 or that the child has
been subject to "aggravated circumstances which include, but are not limited to,
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse and sexual abuse," 56 then WV DHHR is
required to remove the child from the home.
The regulations governing CPS are clear, comprehensive, and sound.
All too often, however, they are not followed. 8 A 1996 legislative audit found
49 W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-9 (1999); see also CPS Poicy, supra note 46, at §3.4.
50 CPS POLICY, supra note 46, at §3.5.
51 Id. at § 3.6.
52 Id. at §3.6-3.7.
53 W. VA. CODE § 49-2D-3 (1999).
54 CPS PoLIcy, supra note 46, at §3.16. Paragraph 3.16 states that:
For situations in which it is believed that the child's welfare or life is immedi-
ately threatened and that immediate action must be taken to prevent serious
harm or additional serious harm and that the situation meets the definition of
imminent danger, the worker will consult with supervisor, insofar as possible,
to determine the best course of action; proceed to implement any temporary
measures to protect the child in-home, if indicated; proceed to initiate legal
action, with supervisory approval, if available, to protect the child; proceed
with the sequence of steps for completing the initial assessment and safety
evaluation, once the child is in temporary protection; and implement the in-
home or out-of-home safety plan, as indicated. Once the immediate crisis is
resolved, it may be possible, based upon the information now available to the
worker and supervisor, to return the child and implement an in-home safety
plan.
55 W. VA. CODE § 49-2D-3 (1999).
56 W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(a)(7) (1999).
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Dawn Miller, West Virginia Fails to Keep Children Safe, Review Finds Problems
With DHHR's Care of Abused and Neglected Children, CHARLESTON GAZETE, Nov. 12, 2002, at
B5 (reporting that a review by the United States Department of Health and Human Services con-
cluded that WV DHHR consistently fails to develop written case plans for the state's abused and
neglected children; that WV DHHR consistently fails to conduct "urgent" investigations and
interviews within the statutorily mandated twelve hour time period; that abused and neglected
children are routinely denied adequate time with their WV DHHR caseworkers).
[Vol. I111
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that CPS conducted face-to-face interviews with the allegedly abused child in
only one-third of the cases surveyed. 59 In thirty-seven percent of the cases sur-
veyed, CPS had no record of conducting a face-to-face interview, despite the
fact that WV DHHR's standards6° and the West Virginia Code61 require that
such interviews be conducted no more than fourteen days after the report was
received.62 "In the remaining 30% of the cases [surveyed], face-to-face inter-
views were ...conducted well in excess of the [required] fourteen-day stan-
dard. 63 A subsequent audit covering January 1, 1997 through September 30,
1997, revealed that ten percent of reported cases of child abuse or neglect had
no record of a face-to-face interview. 64 In 1999, nearly one in five reports of
child abuse or neglect (18.5%) still did not meet the standards set by WV
DHHR. 65
WV DHHR's consistent failure to meet the standards it sets for itself is
one of the primary causes 66 of the system's appalling failure to protect children
like Kimberly Merrill,67 Teresa Mayfield,68 and Jonathan Coffman.
69
The imposition of legal liability in tort for damages that are proximately
caused by WV DHHR's negligence would provide an incentive to WV DHHR
and its employees to conduct thorough investigations and respond aggressively
to the suspected abuse and neglect of the state's foster children. 70 Prior to liti-
5 PERF. EVALUATION RES. Div., OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, COMPLIANCE REVIEW
OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES (1997), available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Joint/
PERD/perdrep/cpsudate2.html [hereinafter 1997 REVIEw].
60 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61 Id.
62 1997 REvIEw, supra note 59.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, UPDATE, COMPLIANCE REvIEw OF CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVICES (1999), http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Joint/PERD/perdrep/cps1999.html. (noting that
"[t]his should be a concern for obvious reasons; children are at risk of further abuse the longer it
takes for intervention. It also becomes more difficult to substantiate an allegation of abuse the
longer it takes to conduct a face to face interview. For example, physical evidence of abuse may
heal.").
66 Catherine D. Munster, Child Abuse, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 2005, at El. Inter-
agency coordination, for example, is a rarity among the state's prosecutors, police, and WV
DHHR. The absence of unfettered inter-agency dialog causes many abuse and neglect incidents
detected by local prosecutors and police to escape WV DHHR's attention. See also Editorial, All
the Details Must Come Out, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 12, 2005, at A4. Additionally, re-
cruiting and retaining skilled, dedicated CPS workers has proven to be a challenge for WV
DHHR, as the state's CPS workers are asked to work long hours for low pay-on average about
$27,000 per year.
67 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
68 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
70 See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 80, 102-03 (1983) (arguing that ex-
panding government liability deters governmental negligence, incompetence, and waste).
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gating his or her claim on the merits, though, the plaintiff-foster child in such a
suit must prove: (1) the existence of a duty owed by WV DHHR to the plaintiff-
foster child and the existence of a cause of action based on the breach of that
duty;71 (2) the existence of liability insurance that provides coverage for the
negligent acts of WV D-HR and its employees; 72 and (3) that his or her suit is
not barred by the state's statutory and governmental immunity. 73 The following
section traces the first step that a plaintiff-foster child must take in a cause of
action based on the negligence of WV DHHR and its CPS workers: establishing
the existence of a duty and a cause of action based on a breach of that duty.
III. A DUTY TO PROTECT
The first element a foster child must prove in a negligence case against
WV DHHR or a CPS worker is the existence of a duty owed by the state to the
plaintiff-foster child.74 The question of whether a duty exists is generally a mat-
ter of law for a court-as opposed to the jury-to decide.75 Generally, federal
law does not impose upon the states a duty to protect children from violence.76
The United States Supreme Court, however, explicitly delegated to the states the
power to create a duty to protect foster children from abuse or neglect.
77
Though West Virginia has not directly addressed the issue of whether WV
DHHR and its CPS workers owe any duty of care to the state's foster children,
the following subsections argue that when faced with the issue, a West Virginia
71 See infra Part III.
72 See infra Part IV.
73 See infra Part V.
74 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed.
1984) (The prima facie elements of negligence are the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty
which proximately causes the plaintiffs injury, and an injury that is compensable with damages).
See also Uthermohlen v. Bogg's Run Min. & Mfg. Co., 40 S.E. 410, 411 (W. Va. 1901) (stating
that there must be a duty resting by law on one person to charge him with damage from the negli-
gence of another, and that no action for negligence will lie without a legal duty broken); Aikens v.
Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 578 (W. Va. 2000) (stating that to establish a prima facie case of negli-
gence in West Virginia, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has been guilty of some act or
omission in violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff, and no action for negligence will lie without
a duty broken); Reed v. Phillips, 452 S.E.2d 708, 712 (W. Va. 1994) (stating that to establish a
cause of action of negligence, a plaintiff must show that the alleged tort-feasor was under a legal
duty or obligation requiring a certain standard of conduct).
75 Lockhart v. Airco Heating and Cooling, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 619, 622 (W. Va. 2002).
76 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs, 489 U.S. 189, 191-93 (1989).
77 Id. at 202. Here the court noted that when the state takes custody of a child and negligently
places the child in danger or otherwise fails to affirmatively protect the child from harm, state tort
law may provide the injured child with a remedy. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323
(1965) (one who undertakes to render services to another may in some circumstances be held
liable for doing so in a negligent fashion); see generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing "special relationships" which may
give rise to affirmative duties to act under the common law of tort).
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court can - and probably will - determine that such a duty stems from both the
state's common and statutory law.
A. A Statutory Duty: The Child Welfare Act
While WV DHHR appears to enjoy considerable autonomy and discre-
tion in developing most of its protocols and standards, 78 Section 49 of the West
Virginia Code (hereinafter the "Child Welfare Act") imposes certain statutory
duties on WV DHHR and its child protective services workers. 79 These duties
include the duty to set standards for foster care homes; 80 the duty to "visit every
certified foster home as often as is necessary to assure that proper care is given
to the children;"81 the duty to remove an abused or neglected child from a foster
home, if the state or one of its agents has reasonable cause to believe that a fos-
ter child is the victim of abuse or neglect; 82 the duty to close foster homes which
provide inadequate care to foster children;83 and the duty to investigate all re-
ports of abuse and neglect.84
When a state agency such as WV DHHR negligently breaches a statute
or regulation, the agency's breach can give rise to a common law negligence
claim if the statute implies a private cause of action.85 In assessing whether a
statute implies a private cause of action against the state arising from a state
agency's negligence, a West Virginia court will apply a four-prong test devel-
78 See, e.g., CPS POLICY, supra note 46; FOSTER CARE POLICY, supra note 34.
79 W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1, et. seq.
80 W. VA. CODE § 49-2-10 (1941) ("It shall be the duty of the state department in cooperation
with the state department of health to establish reasonable minimum standards for foster-home
care to which all certified foster homes must conform."). The duty to establish standards for the
licensing of foster homes is almost certainly a "discretionary function," for which WV DHHR is
afforded immunity from liability. A pre-placement investigation of a potential foster home-a
background check of the potential foster parents, for example-could be deemed a "ministerial
function," for which a CPS worker would not enjoy any immunity. See infra Part V.
81 W. VA. CODE § 49-2-11 (2002); see also W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-9 (2008) (creating a duty to
perform announced or unannounced visits to foster homes at least one time per year).
82 W. VA. CODE § 49-2-14 (2002). This section also imposes a duty on the state to remove any
other children currently residing in the foster home in which the abuse or neglect allegedly took
place. "If the department determines that reasonable cause exists to support the allegation, the
department shall remove all foster children from the arrangement and preclude contact between
the children and the foster parents." A similar duty is imposed by W. VA. CODE § 49-2-12. ("If at
any time the state department shall find a child in an unsupervised foster home where the child is
subject to undesirable influences or lacks proper or wise care and management, it shall take neces-
sary action to remove the child and arrange for his care.").
83 W. VA. CODE § 49-2B- 12 (1977).
84 W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-9 (1977) (imposing a duty to "provide care" for neglected children
upon WV DHHR).
85 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-9 (1926) (permitting the recovery of damages that result from the vio-
lation of a statute); Arbaugh v. Board of Education, 591 S.E.2d 235, 239 (W. Va. 2003) (West
Virginia may assume civil liability by failing to act when action is required by statute).
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oped in Hurley v. Allied Chemical Corporation.86 Under the Hurley test, a court
will analyze (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted, (2) whether the Legislature intended to create a private
cause of action through the statute, (3) whether a private cause of action is con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the Legislative scheme, and (4) whether
a private cause of action would intrude into an area delegated exclusively to the
federal government.
87
When a West Virginia court applies this test to the question of whether
the Child Welfare Act gives rise to civil liability based on negligence that results
in the abuse or neglect of a foster child, the first and fourth prongs will be de-
cided in the plaintiff-foster child's favor. An abused or neglected foster child is
undoubtedly a member of the class that the Child Welfare Act was designed to
protect,88 and the federal government has explicitly abstained from adjudicating
negligence claims of this nature.89 The state may argue, however, that the crea-
tion of a private cause of action is contrary to the legislature's intent and the
legislative purpose underlying the Child Welfare Act.90
This argument, if raised, will likely fail, because in drafting and enact-
ing the Child Welfare Act, the legislature clearly intended to assure the secu-
rity,91 safety,92 and physical well-being of the state's children.93 As previously
stated, WV DHHR has failed and continues to fail in its efforts to meet these
goals. 94 The threat of civil liability is likely to spur the agency and its employ-
ees to thoroughly address and rectify the shortfalls which have resulted in the
abuse and neglect of children like Kimberly Merrill,95 Teresa Mayfield,96 and
Jonathan Coffman. 97 Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested that allow-
ing private causes of action against government entities results in "organized
deterrence" and "better problem-solving" through improved hiring, training, and
86 262 S.E.2d 757, 763 (W. Va. 1980),
87 Id.
88 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 92-93.
89 See DeShaney 489 U.S. at 202 (barring a federal suit by an abused plaintiff-child, but ex-
plicitly delegating to the states the discretion to create a private cause of action in tort against state
child protective services agencies, stating that a "state may, through its courts and legislatures,
impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes.").
90 See, e.g., Arbaugh, 591 S.E.2d at 241.
91 W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1(b) (1999) (it is "the intention of the Legislature to require that any
reunification, permanency or preplacement preventative services address the safety of the child.").
92 W. VA. CODE 49-1-1(a)(1) (1999) ("The purpose of this chapter is to ... assure each child
care [and] safety.").
93 W. VA. CODE 49-1-1(a)(2) (1999) ("The purpose of this chapter is to ... provide for the
physical well-being of each child.").
94 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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investigatory practices. 98 The United States Supreme Court also noted that the
threat of such liability encourages governmental entities to implement internal
procedures and protocols to prevent employee misconduct. 99 In short, allowing
private causes of action in this area would serve the goals and underlying intent
of the Child Welfare Act.
Indeed, a majority' °° of the states which have addressed the issue have
found that statutes similar to the Child Welfare Act will give rise to civil liabil-
ity when a breach of the statutorily created duty results in the abuse or neglect of
a foster child. 10 1 In Vonner v. State Department of Public Welfare,102 for exam-
ple, the Superior Court of Louisiana found Louisiana's Department of Welfare
(analogous to WV DHHR) liable for breaching its statutory duty to provide for a
foster child's "care and well-being" by conducting an inadequate investigation
of reports that the plaintiff-foster child had been severely beaten by his foster
father.10 3  The Vonner court found that the plaintiff/foster child's death was
proximately caused by the Department of Public Welfare's haphazard investiga-
tion of an abuse report that preceded the child's death,' °4 and held that the De-
partment of Public Welfare could not "absolve itself from the results of its fail-
ure in the performance of its legal responsibility that the children be adequately
fed, clothed, and protected from intentional physical abuse causing serious in-
jury ... ,,105 The highest courts of appeals in New York, 1°6 Vermont, 07 and
98 John Cameron McMillan, Jr., Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32 VILL.
L. REv. 505, 507-09 (1987).
99 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980).
100 Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273 So.2d 252, 257-58 (La. 1973) (holding that
statute creates duty to provide for the physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being of foster
child, breach of which gives rise to tort liability, sovereign immunity notwithstanding); Haselhorst
v. State, 485 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Neb. 1992) (holding that county child protective services internal
regulations created a duty to investigate potential foster child placements; negligent breach of this
duty owed to foster children gave rise to tort liability); Bartles v. County of Westchester, 76
A.D.2d 517, 521-22 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that where statute required state child protective ser-
vices agency to provide services and protection to foster children, negligent failure to provide
such services and protection gave rise to liability in tort. Specifically, the court noted that "one
assuming to act, though not under a duty, must act with care, especially when looking after chil-
dren."); LaShay v. Dep't of Soc. and Rehab.Servs., 625 A.2d 224, 228 (Vt. 1993) (holding that
statute creates ministerial duty for social worker to relay reports of foster child abuse to supervi-
sor, beach of which gives rise to tort liability).
101 Id.
102 273 So.2d 252 (La. 1972).
103 Id. at 255 ("[Tlhe Department's liability rests upon a broader base than negligent compli-
ance with its own regulations for the health and care of children in its custody. Nevertheless, even
on this latter basis, the evidence in this record supports recovery against the Department.").
104 Id.
105 Id. at 256.
106 Bartles, 76 A.D.2d at 521-22 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that where statute required state child
protective services agency to provide services and protection to foster children, negligent failure
to provide such services and protection gave rise to liability in tort. Specifically, the court noted
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Nebraska'0 8 have also found that statutes similar to West Virginia's Child Wel-
fare Act create legal duties, a breach of which gives rise to a private cause of
action.
When faced with the issue, a West Virginia court is likely to follow the
majority's lead. Indeed, an analysis of West Virginia's assumed duty of care
regarding the protection of its prisoners may foreshadow the duty the state is
likely to assume regarding the protection of its foster children. In Hackl v.
Dale,1°9 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recognized that prison
officials must act with reasonable care to insure that prisoners are protected
from physical and sexual abuse." 0 Though the Hackl court stated that this duty
stemmed from the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution,"' two years after the Hackl opinion was issued, the court found
that the state's duty to protect its prisoners was statutory in nature, stemming
from the Corrections Management Act's 1 2 mandate "that the Commissioner of
the West Virginia Department of Corrections 'shall manage, direct, control and
govern' those institutions.' 13 Finally, in Skaff v. West Virginia Human Rights
Commission,'1 4 the court recognized "the right to damages for those inmates
who [have been] assaulted" as a result of a breach of this duty. 1' 5
Much like the Corrections Management Act, the Child Welfare Act sets
forth certain duties and responsibilities which WV DHHR and its CPS workers
are obliged to perform. 116 It is unlikely that when faced with the issue, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals will determine that the state's foster children are enti-
tled to less protection than the state's prisoners. Rather, the court will probably
adopt the majority position and hold that the state has a duty of reasonable care
with respect to the protection of the state's foster children, and that a breach of
this duty gives rise to liability in tort.
1 17
that "one assuming to act, though not under a duty, must act with care, especially when looking
after children."); see also Doe by Hickey v. Jefferson County, 985 F.Supp. 66 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
107 LaShay, 625 A.2d at 228 (Vt. 1993) (holding that statute creates ministerial duty for social
worker to relay reports of foster child abuse to supervisor, beach of which gives rise to tort liabil-
ity).
10s Haselhorst, 485 N.W.2d at 184 (Neb. 1992) (holding that county child protective services
internal regulations created a duty to investigate potential foster child placements; negligent
breach of this duty owed to foster children gave rise to tort liability).
109 299 S.E.2d 26 (W.Va. 1982).
"0 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
II' Id. at 28 (citing Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1971)).
112 See W. VA. CODE § 25-1-1, et. seq.
113 Bishop v. McCoy, 323 S.E.2d 140, 145 (W. Va. 1984) (citing W. VA. CODE § 25-1-3
(1977)).
14 444 S.E.2d 39 (W.Va. 1994).
"15 Id. at 42 (citing LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir. 1993)).
116 See supra notes 79-84.
117 See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
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In summary, a private, civil cause of action will deter negligence 118 on
the part of WV DHHR and the state's CPS workers, thereby furthering the un-
derlying intent and overarching goals of the Child Welfare Act.11 9 Therefore,
when a plaintiff-foster child seeks to hold WV DHHR or a CPS worker liable
for negligence that leads to his or her abuse or neglect, a West Virginia court
will likely conclude that all four prongs of the Hurley testl 2° are met, and that
the Child Welfare Act, much like the Corrections Management Act, 12 1 gives rise
to a private cause of action in tort.
The Child Welfare Act, however, is not the only source of law that cre-
ates a duty owed by WV DHHR and its CPS workers to the state's foster chil-
dren. As the next section shows, the state-through WV DHHR and its CPS
workers-has a "special relationship" with its foster children, and this special
relationship creates a common law duty for WV DHHR to protect the state's
foster children from abuse and neglect.
B. A Common Law Duty: The Special Relationship Exception to the Public
Duty Doctrine
Under the Public Duty Doctrine, "a duty to all is a duty to none."' 122 In
other words, when a governmental agency deals generally with the welfare of
all, it does not owe a duty to any individual, unless a special relationship exists
between the governmental agency and an individual.12 The Public Duty Doc-
trine has protected employees of the West Virginia's political subdivisions
(counties, cities, and townships) from tort liability since its adoption in Benson
v. Kutsch124 in 1989.125 The question of whether the doctrine applied to the state
government was not addressed until the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia explicitly adopted it and its "Special Relationship Exception" in Parkulo v.
Board of Probation and Parole.126 In Parkulo, the court held that Chandra Par-
kulo-a woman who had been abducted, sexually assaulted, and beaten by a
man who had been negligently released from prison-failed to set forth an ac-
tionable claim, because "recovery may be had for negligence only if a duty has
118 See supra notes 91-99.
119 See supra notes notes 91-93.
120 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
122 Cannon v. Univ. of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 588-89 (Utah 1993).
123 Id.; see also Parkulo v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 483 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1997); DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 333 (West Group 2000).
124 380 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 1974), overruled on other grounds by O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg,
237 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977).
125 Id. (applying the Public Duty Doctrine to a political subdivision).
126 483 S.E.2d 507, 524 (W. Va. 1998).
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been breached which was owed to the particular person seeking recovery. '' 27
The Department of Corrections, the court determined, owed no specific duty to
Parkulo-rather, the department's duty to maintain custody of its prisoners was
owed to society as a whole.128 Because "a duty to all is a duty to none,"' 1 9 Par-
kulo lacked standing to assert a claim against the department.'
30
Though the Public Duty Doctrine insulates state government entities
from liability where the duty allegedly breached was owed to the public as a
whole, when a government entity has a "special relationship" with a plaintiff,
the rationale underlying the Public Duty Doctrine-that "a duty to all is a duty
to none" 3 '-is nullified.132 Thus, under the "Special Relationship Exception"
to the Public Duty Doctrine, a governmental entity may have a common law
duty to protect an individual from harm. 133 West Virginia adopted the Special
Relationship Exception to the Public Duty Doctrine in Parkulo. Specifically,
the court adopted a four-prong test to determine whether a special relationship
exists between a governmental entity and a plaintiff seeking recovery based on
127 Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 518 (emphasis added). One justification for the public duty doctrine
is that "[ilndividuals, juries, and courts are ill-equipped to judge governmental decisions as to how
particular community resources should be or should have been allocated to protect individual
members of the public." Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn. 1995). One court sug-
gested that such decisions are best reviewed by supervisory personnel who are familiar with the
responsibilities and operations at issue in a particular case. Morgan v. District of Colombia, 468
A.2d 1306, 1312 (D.C. App. 1983). Another court has suggested the public duty doctrine abro-
gates the unfairness that results when a judge or jury making a liability determination enjoys the
benefit of hindsight, while the allegedly negligent actor who made the decision did not. Shore v.
Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379, 1382-84 (Conn. 1982). Finally, one court has suggested that
the public duty doctrine adds an element of practicality to the otherwise complex and confusing
subject of governmental liability. Landis v. Rockdale County, 445 S.E.2d 264, 268 (Ga. 1994).
128 Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 524.
129 Gadd v. United States, 971 F.Supp. 502, 511 (Utah 1997).
130 Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 526 (finding that the public duty doctrine applies to the defendant
and precludes liability, and that nothing in the record disclosed any special relationship between
Parkulo and the defendant).
131 Gadd, 971 F.Supp. at 511.
132 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. ofSoc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Supreme
Court noted that where a "special relationship" stemming from a custodial relationship exists
between a state and one of its citizens, an exception arises to the general rule that a state has no
affirmative duty to protect persons from violence inflicted by private actors. Id. at 199-200. The
DeShaney Court explicitly left open the question of whether the state has an affirmative duty to
protect a child who has been placed in foster care. Id. at 201. "Had the state by the affirmative
exercise of its power removed [the child] from free society and placed him in a foster home oper-
ated by its agents," the Court stated, "we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incar-
cerations or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect .... We express no
view on the validity of this analogy, as it is not before us in the present case.") Some courts have
exploited this concept and applied the special relationship exception to state immunity in cases
where children have been placed and subsequently abused or neglected in foster care.
133 Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 524.
134 Syl. Pt 10, Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d 507.
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that entity's negligent failure to protect him or her from harm.13 5 This test re-
quires: (1) an assumption by the state governmental entity, through promises or
actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2)
knowledge on the part of the state governmental entity's agents that inaction
could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the state govern-
mental entity's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reli-
ance on the state governmental entity's affirmative undertaking.'
36
A juxtaposition of two recent cases illustrates the contours of the Spe-
cial Relationship Exception to the Public Duty Doctrine. In Tucker v. Depart-
ment of Corrections,'37 the administrator of a plaintiff-decedent's estate alleged
that the West Virginia Department of Corrections negligently placed a violent
criminal in a work-release program, thus allowing the criminal to escape and
murder Reginald T. Seamon. 38 First, the Tucker court analyzed whether the
Department of Corrections-and by extension, the state--owed Mr. Seamon a
legal duty of protection from harm. 13 9 The court focused on whether a special
relationship existed between the Department of Corrections and Mr. Seamon.'40
The Tucker court found that Mr. Seamon failed to meet the third prong of the
Special Relationship Exception test, because he never had any direct contact
with the Department of Corrections. 14 1 Thus, no special relationship existed
between Mr. Seamon and the Department of Corrections, and Mr. Seamon's suit
was barred by the Public Duty Doctrine.
42
A similar claim led to a different outcome in McCormick v. West Vir-
ginia Department of Public Safety.143 Here, a prisoner escaped after being
placed in a work-release program and murdered Alicia McCormick, a therapist
employed by the Department of Corrections.'" Mrs. McCormick's claim suc-
ceeded where Mr. Seamon's had failed because Mrs. McCormick served as a
therapist for the Department of Corrections, and had actually counseled her
murderer on several occasions. 45 In its analysis of Mrs. McCormick's claim,
the court stated that the "interconnectedness among the victim, her assailant, and
the public safety agency" raised a factual question as to whether the Department
of Corrections had a special relationship with Mrs. McCormick that created a
135 Syl. Pt 12, Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d 507.
136 Id.; see also Jeffrey v. W. Va. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 511 S.E.2d 152, 155 (W.Va. 1998).
137 530 S.E.2d 448 (W. Va. 1999).
138 Id. at 449-50.
139 id.
14 Id. at 451-52.
141 Id. at 451.
142 Id. at 452.
143 503 S.E.2d 502 (W. Va. 1998)
144 Id. at 507-09.
145 Id. at 504-06.
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common law duty to protect her from harm.' 6 Thus, Mrs. McCormick's claim
against the state for the negligent supervision of a violent felon was litigated on
its merits, while Mr. Seamon's claim was barred by the Public Duty Doctrine.
47
The characteristics that made Mrs. McCormick's claim successful-the
close relationship between the victim, the assailant, and a state agency 148-
would also be present in an abused or neglected foster child's negligence action
against WV DHHR and its CPS workers. Indeed, at least two federal courts and
four state courts have used the Special Relationship Exception to impose a
common law duty and tort liability on child protective services agencies in cases
where a social worker's negligence proximately caused a foster child's abuse or
neglect. 149 It appears that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is
prepared to do the same: the court recently performed a special relationship
analysis in Barbina v. Curry,150 where a plaintiff alleged that WV DHHR's neg-
ligence resulted in the sexual abuse of a minor. 51 After John Barbina and Kelly
Curry divorced, Ms. Curry was awarded custody of the couple's daughter
("A.B."). 52 In the summer of 1998, A.B., then ten years old, was sexually
abused by Charles Curry, her maternal grandfather. 153 In September of 1998,
146 Id. at 508 (citing Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dep't, 412 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1991)).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, applied the special relationship exception to a case in
which a child had been abused in foster care; here, the court found the state liable in tort for fail-
ing to protect the foster child. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794-97 (11th Cir. 1987). Simi-
larly, the Second Circuit found tort liability where a state liable for negligently failing to protect a
child who had been sexually abused while in foster care. Doe v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
709 F.2d 782, 787 (2d Cir. 1983). For write-ups of the Taylor and Doe cases, and an overview of
a foster child's constitutional right to safety and federal causes of action that may arise under 42
U.S.C. 1983, see Terrance J. Dee, Foster Parent Liability Under Section 1983: Foster Parents'
Liability as State Actors for Abuse to Foster Children, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1201, 1205-28 (1981).
Additionally, some of the states' highest appellate courts have issued similar rulings. See, for
example Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 1056 (1970), where the California Court
of Appeals,determined that the special relationship exception applied and overcame state immu-
nity, and found that a cause of action exists when the state fails to comply with its foster home
regulations unless its employees consciously exercise discretion in connection with negligent acts
or omissions. Similarly, in Vonner v. State, 273 So.2d 252, 255 (La. 1973), Louisiana's highest
appellate court found the state liable for violating its foster care rules, because adherence to the
rules would have led to the discovery of the abuse that the claimant/foster child alleged against the
state. New York's Supreme Court found that a county has a non-delegable duty to care for its
foster children and is thus not immune to liability. Bartles v. County of Westchester, 429
N.Y.S.2d 906, 910 (1980). Finally, Utah has created a statutory duty for child protective services
agencies to protect children who reside in foster homes. Little v. Utah Div. of Family Servs., 667
P.2d 49, 53-54 (Utah 1983).
150 650 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 2007).
151 Id. at 143-44.
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A.B. reported the incident to her therapist, Helen Lough.154 Ms. Lough stated
under oath that she reported the incident to WV DHHR, but WV DHHR denied
receiving the report.' 5 On November 25, 1999, Ms. Curry invited Charles Cur-
ry to her home for Thanksgiving. 56 At some point during the visit, Mr. Curry
again sexually assaulted A.B. 5 7 On February 6, 2000, A.B. told Mr. Barbina
about the two incidents of sexual abuse by Mr. Curry. 58 Mr Barbina reported
the incidents to DHHR the next day.159 Mr. Barbina also informed the police of
the matter, and Mr. Curry was subsequently arrested. 6° Mr. Barbina filed
charges against WV DHHR, alleging that the agency's failure to adequately
investigate the 1998 report of sexual abuse proximately caused A.B.'s 1999
injuries. 161 Specifically, Mr. Barbina asserted that: (1) WV DHHR had a duty to
protect A.B. after the initial abuse was reported; (2) WV DHHR breached this
duty; and (3) A.B. was sexually abused as a result. 62 The court initiated its
analysis of Barbina's claim by seeking to determine whether WV DHHR had a
duty to protect A.B. from sexual abuse after the initial 1998 abuse report.
63
In its analysis of Mr. Barbina's claim, the court modified the third prong
of the Special Relationship Exception test-the prong that Mr. Seamon failed to
meet'6-for cases involving child abuse or neglect. 65 Specifically, the court
abrogated the "direct contact" requirement, stating that "due to the statutory
duty of [WV DHHR] to investigate reports of child abuse, the 'direct contact'
requirement of the special relationship doctrine is satisfied through competent
evidence showing that a report of child abuse was actually made to and received
by the [WV DHHR]. ''166 Yet surprisingly, the court unanimously held that Bar-
bina' s complaint failed to meet the modified third prong of the Special Relation-
ship Exception test, because the records produced by Ms. Lough-A.B.'s thera-
pist-which indicated that Ms. Lough reported the initial incident of sexual
abuse to WV DHHR were "insufficient to establish a jury question about [WV]
DHHR's knowledge of the sexual abuse .. ." 167 In short, Mr. Barbina's com-
154 Id.





160 Id. Mr. Curry pied guilty to two charges of first degree sexual abuse, and was sentenced to
two consecutive prison sentences of one to five years.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 147.
163 Id.
164 See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
165 Barbina, 650 S.E.2d at 147.
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plaint was dismissed for factual shortfalls. 168 The existence of a duty owed by
WV DHHR to A.B., however, was not called into question by the court.169 Bar-
bina strongly suggests that the Special Relationship Exception to the Public
Duty Doctrine creates a common law duty for WV DHHR to protect the state's
foster children from abuse and neglect.
In summary, when faced with the issue, a West Virginia trial court will
likely find that WV DHHR and its CPS workers have both a common law and a
statutory duty to protect the state's foster children from abuse and neglect. In-
deed, a statutory "duty to protect" has been imposed on the state as a result of
the Corrections Management Act, and it is unlikely that a court would find that
the state's foster children are entitled to less protection than the state's prisoners.
Further, a plaintiff-foster child will almost certainly be able to prove the exis-
tence of a special relationship and an accompanying common law "duty to pro-
tect" under the Special Relationship Exception test. McCormick shows that a
close relationship between the victim, the assailant, and a state agency can cre-
ate a "duty to protect,"'' 70 and Barbina suggests that the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia has adopted such a duty in child abuse and neglect
cases. 171 Establishing the existence of a duty, however, will not enable a plain-
tiff-foster child to hold WV DHHR and its CPS workers legally liable for negli-
gence that causes his or her abuse or neglect. As the following sections show,
the mere existence of a duty does not abrogate the state's second defense against
liability-"sovereign immunity."
IV. A GENERAL BAR TO CLAIMS NOT COVERED BY THE STATE'S LIABILITY
INSURANCE COVERAGE POLICY
There is no simple answer to the question of whether West Virginia is
immune from liability for negligence that leads to child abuse or neglect, as the
extent of the immunity that West Virginia enjoys from legal liability in tort has
been a consistent point of contention over the last twenty-five years. 172 In fact,
since the early 1970s, the scope of the governmental immunity in West Virginia
168 Id. at 149.
169 Id. at 146-49.
170 See supra notes 143-147.
171 See supra notes 150-169.
172 W. Va. Univ. v. Graf, 516 S.E.2d 741, 747 (W. Va. 1998) (Starcher, J., dissenting)
("Someday, I think, a number of thorny sovereign immunity issues should and will be more thor-
oughly addressed by this Court. My sense is that our sovereign immunity jurisprudence has come
to be - from a theoretical or academic perspective - fairly confused. I further sense that this juris-
prudential confusion has unfortunately created a fertile field for opportunistic attempts by litigants
to escape liability for their wrongdoing, by the last-minute assertion of sovereign immunity.").
[Vol. I111
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has been abolished,'73 revived, 7 4 expanded,175 and abrogated 76 by the state's
common law, sometimes in the same opinion.1
77
While the nature and the scope of the state's immunity from liability
based on tort has been modified through the common law, 178 the existence of the
state's immunity stems from Article VI, Section 35 of the West Virginia State
Constitution, which states that "[t]he State of West Virginia shall never be
made defendant in any court of law or equity."'179 Though the immunity
provided to the state through Article VI, Section 35 has been described as "ab-
solute" and "non-waivable,"' 180 West Virginia, like most states,'8' has created a
plethora of exceptions to the state's immunity from legal liability. 82 The ori-
gins of these exceptions to state immunity are also constitutional in nature,
stemming from Article 1II, Section 17 of the West Virginia State Constitution,
which provides that "[tihe courts of this State shall be open, and every person,
173 Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975), superseded by statute, W.VA.
CODE § 29-12A-1, et. seq. (holding that the "rule of municipal governmental immunity was abol-
ished in West Virginia.").
174 Higginbotham v. City of Charleston, 204 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1974), overruled on other
grounds by O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977) (holding that art. VI, §
35 of the West Virginia Constitution, granting sovereign immunity to the State, does not apply to
municipalities; rather, cities can be held liable in private actions for failing to repair and maintain
streets and sidewalks, in violation of state statute).
175 Clark v. Dunn, 465 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995) (expanding common law qualified immunity
that public officials enjoy to preclude liability for any "discretionary act," except where the offi-
cial abuses that discretion by violating a clearly established constitutional right).
176 Pittsburgh Elevator v. W.Va. Bd. of Regents, 310 S.E.2d 675, 688-89 (W. Va. 1983) (allow-
ing, for the first time, a negligence claim against the state to be litigated on its merits, and stating
that recovery may be had "under and up to" the limits of the state's liability insurance policy).
177 See Parkulo v. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 483 S.E.2d 507, 523 (W. Va. 1996) (adopting and
applying all common law immunities that had been afforded to political subdivisions to the state,
but affirming the Pittsburgh Elevator court's assertion that recovery may be had in spite of sover-
eign immunity so long as the state's liability insurance policy provides coverage for the occur-
rence which gave rise to the plaintiff's injury). Additionally, the Parkulo court recognized the
Public Duty Doctrine, which prohibits recovery for duties that the state or one of its agencies
"owes to society as a whole", but also adopted the Special Relationship Exception to the Public
Duty Doctrine, which allows for recovery when a state agency negligently fails to protect a plain-
tiff with whom it had a special relationship. Id. at 519-20, 524-25.
178 See supra notes 172-177 and accompanying text.
179 W. VA. CONST. art.Vl, § 35.
1so Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 359 S.E.2d 124, 129 (W. Va. 1987); Grant P.H. Shuman, Note,
Common Law Tort Immunity For State Officials in W Va. After the Parkulo v. W. Va. Bd. Of
Prob. Decision,103 W. VA. L. REv. 261, 266-67 (2000).
s18 Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 310 S.E.2d 675, 680 n.6 (W.Va. 1983) (noting
that nationwide, "[s]overeign immunity of the state is now the exception rather than the rule.").
182 See, e.g., Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d 507, 519-20, 523-25 (W. Va. 1996) (adopting the Special
Relationship Exception to the Public Duty Doctrine, and affirming the Pittsburgh Elevator court's
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for an injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall have rem-
edy by due course of law; and justice shall be administered without sale, denial
or delay."'
183
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed the incon-
gruity of Article VI, Section 35 and Article III, Section 17 in Pittsburgh Eleva-
tor Company v. West Virginia Board of Regents.184 Here, the Court considered
the case of four-year-old Joseph Martin, who was injured after falling from the
stage of the main theater in the Creative Arts Center at West Virginia Univer-
sity.185 Joseph's parents filed suit against the West Virginia Board of Regents
(the "Board") as owner of the Creative Arts Center. 186 The lower court granted
the Board's motion to dismiss,187 and the Martins subsequently appealed.
In an attempt to reconcile Article VI, Section 35's ostensibly broad
grant of immunity to the state with Article IH, Section 17's guarantee of due
process and open courts, the court drew a distinction between the state and the
"government of the state."'188 The state, the court opined, represents the "ideal
person, intangible, invisible, immutable .... ,189 The government of the state, in
contrast, is "a mere agent, and, within the spirit of the agency, a perfect repre-
sentative, but outside of that, a lawless usurper."19' Because the state is "[p]ure,
unsullied, and infallible," it is immune from legal liability.191 In contrast, the
state government--comprised of the state's tribunals and officers-is capable of
"doing wrong" and may be "disavowed" and "repudiate[d]" by the state for its
negligence or malfeasance.1
92
Ultimately, the court ruled in Martin's favor, allowing him to breach the
shield of immunity that had previously protected the West Virginia Board of
183 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17; see also Deller v Naymick, 342 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1985)
(stating that to prevent an injured party from collecting against the state where the state has insur-
ance coverage is a violation of due process); Jeffrey v. W.Va. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, Div. of Corr.,
482 S.E.2d 226, 232 ("Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recov-
ery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the
traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State."). Conversely, where the state does not
have coverage, liability cannot attach. State ex. Rel. Thrasher Eng'g v. Fox, 624 S.E.2d 481, 487
(W. Va. 2005).
184 310 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1983).
185 Id. at 677.
186 Id.
187 Id. Though the Board's motion to dismiss simply asserted that suits against the state may
only be filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, the Pittsburgh Elevator court considered at
length the implications of art. VI, § 35's grant of immunity to the state.
188 Id. at 683.
189 Id. (citing Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1885)).
19 Id. (citing Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290-91 (1885)).
191 Id. (citing Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley, 67 S.E.2d 613, 619-20 (W. Va. 1910).
192 Id. ("Though [the state's] officers and tribunals may [do wrong], [the state] never sustains
nor upholds them in it. On the contrary, she disavows and repudiates their wrongful acts.").
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Regents 193 -and the state's other agencies-in the past,194 reasoning that once
the distinction between the state and the government of the state is recognized,
"the traditional bar to suit contained in Article VI, [Section] 35 loses all valid-
ity.' 195 To assuage concerns that governmental liability may be detrimental to
the state's financial health, 196 the court in Pittsburgh Elevator set forth a com-
prehensive overview of the relationship between governmental immunity and
the insurance purchased by the state to insure against tort liability. 197 The court
noted that in essence, when the government's insurance policy covers a given
occurrence, monies sought by plaintiffs as a result of such an occurrence are not
sought from the state, but from the state's insurer. 198 Thus, the "paramount justi-
193 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had previously held in City of Morgantown
v. Ducker, 168 S.E.2d 298 (1969), that the West Virginia Board of Regents was constitutionally
immune from suit under W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
194 Id.; see also Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. W.Va. Bd. of Regents, 527 F.Supp. 1366 (S.D. Ohio
1981); Santiago v. Clark, 444 F.Supp. 1077 (N.D. W. Va. 1978); Kondos v. W. Va. Bd. of Re-
gents, 318 F.Supp. 394 (S.D. W. Va. 1970), affd, 441 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir.1971); Scott v. Taylor,
160 S.E.2d 146 (W. Va. 1968).
195 Id. at 684. The Pittsburgh Elevator court found a lengthy and strongly-worded defense of
the distinction between the state and the government of the state in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 270, 291 (1885), where the United States Supreme Court asked:
Of what avail are written constitutions, whose bills of right for the security of
individual liberty have been written, too often, with the blood of martyrs shed
upon the battle field [sic] and the scaffold, if their limitations and restraints
upon power may be overpassed with impunity by the very agencies appointed
to guard, defend and enforce them; and that, too, with the sacred authority of
law, not only compelling obedience, but entitled to respect? And how else can
these principles of individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when vio-
lated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual of-
fenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenever they interpose the shield
of the State.
The Poindexter Court concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity "cannot be tolerated," as
"[ilt is the doctrine of absolutism, pure simple [sic] and naked; and of communism, which is its
twin; the double progeny of the same evil birth." Id.
196 Proponents of governmental immunity generally assert that the state should be able to pro-
vide for the "protection of the public without thereby exposing the taxpayers to liability for omis-
sions in its attempts to enforce [the law]." See, e.g., Benson v. Kutsch, 380 S.E.2d 36, 38 (W.Va.
1989). In short, the importance of the state's financial health is the primary justification for afford-
ing the state immunity against liability stemming from its performance or delivery of services and
protection. See also Pittsburgh Elevator, 310 S.E.2d at 688 (W.Va. 1983) (citing State v. Ruthbell
Coal Co., 56 S.E.2d 549 (W.Va. 1949)) ("The paramount justification underlying the constitu-
tional grant of immunity is to protect the financial structure of the state.").
197 Russell v. Busch & Burchett, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 36, 43 (W. Va. 2001) ("W.Va. CODE, 29-12-1
evidences a remedial legislative purpose that the State establish mechanisms that will assure that
the State is financially responsible and accountable for injuries occasioned by culpable State ac-
tion" without diverting state monies from legislatively appropriated purposes.). See also Shuman,
supra note 180, 266-67.
198 Pittsburgh Elevator, 310 S.E.2d at 688 ("Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but
rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance
coverage fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State.").
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fication"'199 for state immunity-the financial well-being of the state-is nulli-
fied, as long as the compensation that an adverse party receives does not exceed
the limits of the state's insurance policy.
2°°
Applying this principle, the Pittsburgh Elevator court reasoned that
Martin did not, in fact, seek recovery of monies from the state, but from the
state's insurer,20 1 and Martin's claim survived the Board's motion to dismiss.
20 2
In the wake of Pittsburgh Elevator, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia addressed numerous cases in which plaintiffs sought to hold the
state government legally liable for damages "under and up to" the limits of the
state's liability insurance coverage.20 3 While the outcomes of such cases have
varied considerably, the decisive factor in each of Pittsburgh Elevator's progeny
is whether the conduct the plaintiff complained of was covered by the state's
liability insurance policy.2°4 When the conduct is covered in the state's liability
insurance policy, the state's sovereign immunity is negated; when the conduct is
not covered, sovereign immunity applies and the plaintiffs claim will be
barred.20 5
As the next section shows, West Virginia's liability insurance policy
provides coverage for the negligent acts and omissions of WV DHHR and its
employees, thus potentially allowing a plaintiff-foster child who is abused or
199 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
200 Id. at 688. See also Madden v. W. Va. Dep't of Transp., 453 S.E.2d 331, 334 (W. Va. 1994)
(noting that the state's "[i]mmunity is relaxed only to the extent of the liability coverage.").
201 Pittsburgh Elevator, 310 S.E.2d at 688. Suits that seek "no recovery from state funds, but
rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits to the State's liability insurance
coverage fall outside of the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State." See also Jef-
frey v. W. Va. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, Div. of Corr., 482 S.E.2d 226, 232 (W. Va. 1996) ("Suits
which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to
the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar
to suits against the State."). Technically, section 29-12-5 does not waive the state's constitutional
immunity, rather the statute renders such immunity inapplicable to the extent of insurance cover-
age purchased by the state. Pittsburgh Elevator, 310 S.E.2d at 689. The logic underlying this
scheme was captured in the Pittsburgh Elevator court's assertion that "where recovery is sought
against the State's liability insurance coverage, the doctrine of constitutional immunity, designed
to protect the public purse, is simply inapplicable." Id.
202 Pittsburgh Elevator, 310 S.E.2d at 690.
203 See, e.g., King v. Heffernan, 591 S.E.2d 761 (W. Va. 2003); Shaffer v. Stanley, 2003 WL
22850002 (W. Va. 2003); Arnold Agency v. W. Va. Lottery Comm'n, 526 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va.
1999); W. Va. Univ. v. Graf, 516 S.E.2d 741 (W. Va. 1998); see also Roach v. Burke, 825
F.Supp. 116 (N.D. W.Va. 1993); Haney v. County Comm'n, 575 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 2002).
204 Compare Eggleston v. Dep't of Highways, 429 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1993) (finding that the
state liable in tort for the negligent maintenance of an incomplete road, because the state's liability
insurance policy provides coverage for negligence connected to the maintenance of state roads
that are under construction) with Shrader v. Holland, 414 S.E.2d 448 (W. Va. 1992) (finding the
state immune from liability in tort for the negligent maintenance of an state road, because the
state's liability insurance policy did not provide coverage for negligence connected to the mainte-
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neglected as a result of such negligence to hold the government of the state li-
able in tort for his or her injuries.
A. The State's Current Liability Insurance Policy and WV DHHR
Under the state's current liability insurance policy, a plaintiff-foster
child who alleges that WV DHHR's or a CPS worker's negligence proximately
caused his or her abuse or neglect could likely prove that such negligence is
covered by the "wrongful acts" provision of the state's liability insurance pol-
icy. In 2007, the West Virginia Board of Risk and Insurance Management
(BRIM) purchased the state's current liability insurance policy (covering the
period from July 1, 2007 to July 1, 2008) from the National Union Fire Insur-
ance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa.206 "Coverage E" of this policy insures the
state against liability and damages stemming from "wrongful acts" of the state,
its agencies, and its employees.20 7 Under the terms of the policy, "wrongful
acts" includes "any actual or alleged act, breach of duty, neglect, error, mis-
statement, misleading statement or omission by [the state, its agencies, or its
employees] in the performance of their duties for [West Virginia]. 2 °8 Like the
terms in any insurance contract, "Coverage E" is to be read in accordance with
the maxim that "[1]anguage in an insurance policy should be given its plain,
ordinary meaning. '' 209 Thus, even if Shaffer's unfounded assertion that BRIM is
required to procure insurance for all of DHHR's responsibilities and activities is
overruled, narrowed, or otherwise abrogated, it is likely that a West Virginia
court will determine that "Coverage E" of the state's current liability insurance
policy insures the state against WV DHHR's and CPS workers' negligent acts
and 210and omissions.zl
206 NAT'L UNION FIRE INS. Co. OF PITTSBURGH, PA, WEST VIRGINIA COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY
COVERAGE FORM (2006-2007), http://www.state.wv.uslBrimlUnder/2008%20Policies/State
%20Liability%2OPolicy.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
207 Id. at 14.
208 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
209 Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., Inc., 345 S.E.2d 33, 33 (W. Va. 1986), abrogated on other
grounds by Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488 (W. Va. 1987). Thus,
"[wlhere provisions in an insurance policy are plain and unambiguous ... the provisions will be
applied and not construed." Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 639, 642 (W. Va.
1985); Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 172 S.E.2d 714, 715 (W. Va. 1970) ("[W]here
the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to
judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning in-
tended.").
210 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently held that Coverage E's broad
verbiage insured the state against the legal damages that resulted from resulted from multiple
instances of sexual assault committed by a teacher against four elementary students. Bender v.
Glendenning, 632 S.E.2d 330, 332-35, 337 (2006); see also Syl. Pt. 2 Shamblin v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1985); Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 172 S.E.2d
714, 715 (W. Va. 1970) ("[W]here the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and
20091 1003
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In short, for the time being, a foster child who is abused or neglected as
a result of WV DHHR's or a CPS worker's negligence will almost certainly be
able to prove that the state's liability insurance policy provides coverage for
such negligence.
The existence of such coverage in the future is by no means guaranteed.
Under § 29-12-5 of the West Virginia Code, the West Virginia Board of Risk
and Insurance Management, BRIM, is tasked with negotiating and procuring a
liability insurance policy for the State of West Virginia.211 Section 29-12-5 does
not direct BRIM to purchase liability insurance coverage for WV DHHR, but
delegates BRIM the authority to do so at its discretion.212 In short, the ability of
a foster child who is abused or neglected as a result of WV DHHR's negligence
to hold the state accountable for such negligence depends on whether BRIM
renews WV DHHR's liability insurance coverage from year to year. Should
BRIM choose to narrow the scope of or even discontinue coverage, the plaintiff-
foster child's ability to litigate his or her claim on the merits will be seriously
jeopardized.
Even assuming such coverage continues, the State will undoubtedly as-
sert one or more common law or statutory immunities in a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's claim. As the next section shows, overcoming the state's common law
and statutory immunities will likely prove to be the most challenging aspect of
the plaintiff-foster child's claim.
unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be
given to the plain meaning intended.").
211 W. Va. CODE § 29-12-5(a) (1933).
212 WV DHHR is defined as a "charitable organization" under West Virginia Code § 29-12-
5(b)(1)(B) and West Virginia Code § 29-12-5(b)(2) (BRIM "may, but is not required to, provide
property and liability insurance to insure the property, activities and responsibilities of ... chari-
table [organizations] .... ). Cf. Shaffer v. Stanley, 593 S.E.2d 629, 639 (W. Va. 2003) ("Board of
Risk and Insurance Management had a statutory duty to purchase or contract for insurance to
provide coverage for all of the DHHR's activities and responsibilities."). Though the language of
the statute is clear, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia inexplicably held in Shaffer v.
Stanley, 593 S.E.2d 629, 631-42 (W. Va. 2003), that § 29-12-5(a) requires BRIM to procure in-
surance which provides coverage for "all of the [WV] DHHR's activities and responsibilities."
Justice Davis, in a strong and emphatic dissent to the Shaffer opinion, chastised the majority for
stating in a "sweeping and unprecedented manner" that BRIM has a statutory duty to provide
coverage for "all" of WV DHHR's activities and responsibilities. Id. at 642. In fact, Justice Da-
vis is correct in characterizing the majority's opinion as "profoundly misguided," as § 29-12-5
unambiguously grants BRIM the discretion to determine the "amount and kind of coverage" pro-
vided to WV DHHR through the state's liability insurance policy: Id. at 642; see also W. Va.
CODE § 29-12-5(a)(1)(B)-(C) (delegating to BRIM the authority to determine the "amount" and
"kind of coverage" provided to most of the state's agencies-including WV DHHR-through the
state's liability insurance contract). Indeed, the majority declined to provide any rationale for its
assertion that BRIM is required to insure WV DHHR against liability based on tort. Thus, Shaffer
is vulnerable to being overruled, should it ever be challenged on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Guthrie,
461 S.E.2d 163, 185 n. 28 (W. Va. 1995) ("[A] precedent-creating opinion that contains no extrin-
sic analysis of an important issue is more vulnerable to being overruled.").
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V. IMMUNITY AND THE STATE
West Virginia has not yet addressed the extent of immunity that WV
DHHR or CPS workers enjoy from liability in tort. The issue was raised in West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources v. Kaufman,213 where
WV DHHR and two CPS workers attempted to assert that statutory immunity
214
and qualified immunity215 warranted the dismissal of a negligence suit against
WV DHHR. The Kaufman court did not address the substance of WV DHHR's
immunity claims, opting instead to remand the case "for thorough evaluation of
each of the immunities alleged by [WV] DHHR. 2 16 The following sections
argue that when WV DHHR and its CPS workers assert the same immunities in
future cases, a plaintiff-foster child will be able to overcome both statutory im-
munity and qualified immunity, and hold both WV DHHR and its CPS workers
liable in tort for negligence that results in the child's abuse or neglect.
A. Breaching the State's Statutory Immunity
Section 49-6A-6 of the West Virginia Code ostensibly provides WV
DHHR and its employees with complete immunity from civil liability, so long
as they act in good faith.217 However, a juxtaposition of two recent cases-
Shrader v. Holland218 and Eggleston v. Department of Highways219-provides
an illustration of the limits of statutory sovereign immunity under West Virginia
common law. Both of these cases involved negligence claims against the De-
partment of Highways ("DOH") based on the allegedly defective condition of
state roads that DOH was responsible for maintaining.22° In both cases, DOH
213 506 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1998).
214 Id. at 95.
215 Id. Additionally, WV DHHR asserted that it enjoyed "quasi-judicial immunity" from such
claims. A discussion of quasi-judicial immunity is beyond the scope of this Note, however, as
such immunity would provide immunity to officials who participate in judicial proceedings related
to the decision of whether to adjudicate a child "abused" or "neglected." See, e.g., Moats v. Pre-
ston County Comm'n, 521 S.E.2d 180, 186-87 (W. Va. 1999); Rifle v. Armstrong, 477 S.E.2d
535, 553 (W. Va. 1996). Quasi-judicial immunity would not apply to the negligent investigation
of a foster home prior to placement, or to the negligent investigation of a report of abuse or ne-
glect. Id. See generally Shuman, supra note 180, at 279-80 (note that Shuman's overview applies
to employees of political subdivisions).
216 Kaufman, 506 S.E.2d 93, 95 (W. Va. 1998).
217 W. Va. CODE § 49-6A-6 (1977) ("Any person, official or institution participating in good
faith in any act permitted or required by [the Child Welfare Act] shall be immune from any civil
or criminal liability that otherwise might result by reason of such actions.").
218 414 S.E.2d 448 (W. Va. 1992).
219 429 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1993).
220 Shrader, 414 S.E.2d at 449; Eggleston, 429 S.E.2d at 638.
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claimed that the plain language of § 17-4-3722' of the West Virginia Code pro-
vided complete immunity from suits based on the negligent maintenance of state
roads.222 In fact, § 17-4-37 actually does provide DOH with a broad grant of
immunity from negligence claims, stating that "[t]he State shall not be made the
defendant in any proceeding to recover damages because of the defective con-
struction or condition of any state road or bridge., 223 The outcomes of these
cases, however, turned not on extent of statutory immunity that § 17-4-37
granted DOH, but on the extent of the coverage provided to DOH in the state's
liability insurance policy.
224
In Shrader, a plaintiff sued Sysco Corporation ("Sysco") on behalf of
her deceased husband, who was killed in a vehicle accident with a Sysco
truck.2 25 Sysco filed a third party complaint against DOH.226 DOH, in turn,
filed a motion to dismiss Sysco's third party compliant on the grounds that § 17-
4-37 provided it with statutory immunity from Sysco's complaint.227 Surpris-
ingly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia barely addressed § 17-4-
37's grant of immunity, focusing instead on the terms of the policy provision,
which did not provide coverage for claims related to the:
[o]wnership, maintenance, supervision, operation, use of [sic]
control of streets ... but this exclusion does not apply to bodily
injury or property damages which arises out of and occurs dur-
ing the performance or [sic] construction, street cleaning, and
repair operations, or arises out of the maintenance or use of si-
dewalks which abut buildings covered by this policy.
228
Applying the language of this policy provision to the case at hand, the
Supreme Court of Appeals determined that the state's liability insurance policy
did not provide coverage that would compensate Sysco in the event Sysco's
third-party claim was successful.22 9 Thus, Sysco's claim was dismissed.23 °
Though Sysco failed to breach the state's shield of immunity, dicta in Shrader
indicated that even where the state has explicitly afforded itself immunity by
221 West Virginia Code § 17-4-37 (1933) provides that "[t]he State shall not be made the defen-
dant in any proceeding to recover damages because of the defective construction or condition of
any state road or bridge."
222 Shrader, 414 S.E.2d at 449; Eggleston, 429 S.E.2d at 638.
223 W. Va. CODE § 17-4-37 (1933).
2M Shrader, 414 S.E.2d at 450; Eggleston, 429 S.E.2d at 642.
225 Shrader, 414 S.E.2d at 449.
226 Id. (the court did not state what Sysco's third party complaint alleged against the DOH).
227 Id.
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statute, the immunity is abrogated so long as the conduct a plaintiff complains
of is covered by the state's insurance policy.
23 1
Two years after issuing its opinion in Shrader, the court reinforced this
point in Eggleston v. Department of Highways,232 where Homer Eggleston as-
serted that the DOH negligently failed to post appropriate warning signs on an
incomplete road.233 Mr. Eggleston claimed that he sustained serious injuries as a
result of the DOH's negligence. 234 The DOH moved for summary judgment,
citing Shrader and asserting that it was immune from Eggleston's suit.235 The
circuit court granted the DOH's motion, and Mr. Eggleston appealed.236
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's analysis of
Mr. Eggleston's complaint mirrored the court's analysis in Shrader. Specifi-
cally, the court noted that Section 17-4-37 provides that the state will not be
made a defendant "in any proceeding to recover damages because of the defec-
tive construction or condition of any state road .... ,,237 However, the court's
true focus in Eggleston, much like the court's focus in Shrader,238 was on
whether the conduct Mr. Eggleston complained of was covered by the state's
liability insurance policy. 239 The policy provision which governed the outcome
in Shrader was identical to the policy provision at issue in Eggleston, providing
coverage only for claims that "arise[s] out of and occur[s] during the perform-
ance or [sic] construction, street cleaning, and repair operations .... "m Unlike
Sysco's complaint in Shrader, Mr. Eggleston's complaint alleged that the road
at issue was still under construction at the time of the accident in question. 24'
231 Id.; see also Louck v. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 479 S.E.2d 911, 917 (W. Va. 1996) (holding that
because the State's wrongful act liability policy did not provide coverage against alleged wrongful
acts of Department of Highways in connection with accident, department could not be held liable
under exception to sovereign immunity).
232 429 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1994).
233 Id. at 637-38.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 637.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 638 (citing W. Va. CODE § 17-4-37). The court also noted that "W. Va. CODE 29-12-
5(a) (1986), provides an exception for the State's constitutional immunity found in Section 35 of
Article VI of the West Virginia Constitution. It requires the State Board of Risk and Insurance
Management to purchase or contract for insurance and requires that such insurance policy 'shall
provide that the insurer shall be barred and estopped from relying upon the constitutional immu-
nity of the State of West Virginia against claims or suits."'). Id.
238 See supra notes 225-231 and accompanying text.
239 Eggleston, 429 SE.2d at 638-39 ("Our focus is ... whether the insurance policy at issue
provides coverage for the type of accident that occurred in this case.").
240 Id.
241 Id. at 640.
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Specifically, Mr. Eggleston stated that because DOH planned and intended242 to
post appropriate warning signs on the portion of the road where Eggleston's
accident occurred, construction was not yet complete.243 Thus, argued Mr.
Eggleston, his claim fell under the "performance of construction" 244 clause in
the governing provision of the state's liability insurance policy.
245
Following an analysis of the terms "construction, 246 and "perform-
ance,'247 the court ruled in favor of Mr. Eggleston, and reversed the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment to the DOH. The court reasoned that while
the majority of the work on the road in question had been completed, at least
some work-specifically, the installation of the warning sign that Mr. Eggleston
based his pleading on-remained to be done.248 Thus, the court concluded that
Mr. Eggleston's suit fell within the purview of the "performance of construc-
tion" exception in the state's liability insurance policy, and Mr. Eggleston's
claim was allowed to proceed in spite of the broad grant of immunity afforded
to DOH in section 17-4-37.249
In short, Eggleston and Shrader illustrate the limits of statutory immu-
nity in West Virginia. Comparing the two cases reveals that when the state's
liability insurance policy provides coverage for the negligence that causes an
individual's injuries, the negligence is actionable in tort even where a statute
explicitly provides immunity to the negligent actor. Because the state's current
liability insurance policy currently provides coverage for WV DHHR and CPS
worker negligence,250 a plaintiff-foster child should have little difficulty over-
coming the statutory immunity granted to WV DHHR and CPS workers in Sec-
tion 49-6A-6 of the West Virginia Code.
242 The DOH stipulated to Eggleston's accusation that the project plan for the road at issue
called for a large warning sign to be posted on the hill where Eggleston's accident took place. Id.
at 642.
243 Id. at 641.
244 While the policy provision at issue originally read "performance or construction", the Eg-
gleston court determined that the provision was meant to read "performance of construction." Id.
at 640.
245 Id. at 641.
246 Id. at 640 (concluding that "construction" does not end "before the thing constructed is
complete.").
247 Id. at 641 (citing THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 689 (1970)) (citing with approval The
Oxford English Dictionary's definition of the term, which reads "accomplishment, execution,
carrying out, working out of anything ordered or undertaken; the doing of any action or work.").
248 Id. at 642 ("We cannot say that there was complete performance of construction because
there was a portion of the work left to be done according to the project plans.").
249 Sd. at 64 1.250 See supra, note 206-209 and accompanying text.
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B. Overcoming the State's Qualified Immunity
Under West Virginia common law, "qualified immunity" insulates pub-
lic officials and the agencies they work for-such as CPS workers and WV
DHHR-from liability that arises from "discretionary" duties.251 A public offi-
cial acts in a discretionary manner when he or she enjoys latitude in deciding
whether and how to carry out a particular duty.252 Conversely, the state's com-
mon law jurisprudence does not provide immunity for liability arising from
"ministerial" acts.253 A duty is deemed ministerial when it is "absolute, certain,
and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task, and when the law
which imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion of its per-
formance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discre-
tion. 2
54
Thus, a plaintiff-foster child seeking to hold WV DHHR or a CPS
worker legally liable for negligence that proximately causes his or her abuse or
neglect must prove that the CPS worker either negligently performed or failed to
perform a ministerial function, and that this negligence proximately caused his
or her injuries. 25 If, on the other hand, the CPS worker can prove that the neg-
ligent act or omission that gave rise to the plaintiff-foster child's claim was
"discretionary" in nature, then qualified immunity might apply256 and bar the
claim. 2
57
Unfortunately, the extent of the qualified immunity that West Virginia's
public officials enjoy is ill-defined. So too are the precise definitions of what
constitutes a "ministerial" and a "discretionary" act.258 The contours of "discre-
tionary" act-based qualified immunity were partially illustrated in Clark v.
Dunn,259 where a plaintiff sought recovery for injuries allegedly caused by a
251 Parkulo v. Board of Prob. and Parole, 483 S.E.2d 507, 524 (W. Va. 1998); Clark v. Dunn,
465 S.E.2d 374, 379 (W. Va. 1995).
252 State v. Chase Sec., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591, 597 (W. Va. 1992).
A public official may be found personally liable for his or her official acts if it
is shown that the official, in the exercise of discretionary powers, has injured a
party through the violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional
fights of which a reasonable person would have known. The official may es-
cape liability by showing that the statutory or constitutional right was not so
clearly established that a reasonable official would have been aware of it.
Id.
253 Clark, 465 S.E.2d at 379 (W. Va. 1995) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
254 Chase, 424 S.E.2d at 598-99 (1992) (providing the quoted definition, but noting that it is
sometimes "virtually impossible" to distinguish between ministerial and discretionary acts).
25 See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 253-254 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
258 See supra note 254.
259 465 S.E.2d 374.
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Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") officer's negligence. While the
facts of this case are not entirely clear, the record may be summarized as fol-
lows.
The defendant, DNR Officer Dunn, suspected that Dale Clark was
poaching deer on state property.2 ° Officer Dunn confronted Clark and another
suspected poacher, Eugene Bailey, and ordered them to unload their rifles and
set them on the ground.26' Clark complied with Officer Dunn's order.262 Bailey,
however, attempted to retrieve his hunting license while still holding his wea-
pon.263 Officer Dunn drew his pistol and held it on Bailey. 264 At some point
Officer Dunn's weapon accidentally discharged, wounding Clark in the leg.265
Clark filed suit against Officer Dunn and the DNR, alleging that Officer Dunn
was negligent throughout the confrontation and that Dunn's negligence proxi-
mately caused his injury.266 Officer Dunn successfully argued that he enjoyed
qualified immunity from such a suit and thus could not, as a matter of law, be
held liable for any alleged negligence. 267 In affirming the lower court's dis-
missal of Clark's claim, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated
that when a public officer is either authorized or required to make a decision and
to perform acts in the making of that decision, "he is not liable for negligence or
other error in the making of that decision, at the suit of a private individual
claiming to have been damaged thereby. 268
When faced with the issue, it is possible that the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia will find that a CPS worker enjoys the same qualified
immunity in performing his or her duties that Officer Dunn enjoyed in executing







267 Id. at 376. The qualified immunity that Officer Dunn referred to in his motion for summary
judgment is a common law creation, adopted in West Virginia in State v. Chase Securities, 424
S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1992). Here, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that public officials-such
as Officer Dunn-are immune from liability arising out of acts committed within the scope of
their employment unless the act or acts violate "clearly established laws of which a reasonable
official would have known." Id. at 600. The rationale underlying this rule is that a public official
should not be hindered in the execution of their duties, so long as the public official is not bla-
tantly, knowingly violating the law in executing such duties. The point was best summarized by
the United States Supreme Court as follows: "A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probably
cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does." Clark, 465 S.E.2d at 379 (citing Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)). The court noted that because Officer Dunn had not violated a clear-
ly established law in his confrontation with Clark and Bailey, he could not be held liable for the
mere negligence that Clark asserted. Id.
268 Clark, 465 S.E.2d at 380.
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the arrest of Clark and Bailey. Such a ruling is not a foregone conclusion,
though. In fact, a majority of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue
have concluded that at least some of the duties that CPS workers perform on
behalf of foster children-including the duty to investigate a foster home prior
to licensing the home,269 the duty to investigate reports of abuse inflicted on a
foster child by his foster parents, 270 the duty to inspect and supervise foster par-
ents,271 and the duty to execute any duty related to foster care that is proscribed
by statute or regulation 272-are ministerial, rather than discretionary, in nature.
A similar ruling by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia would be
rational, as CPS workers have "absolute, certain, and imperative"
273 statutory274
and regulatory275 mandates to perform each of these tasks.
VI. RECOMMENDED COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY REFORMS
Parts I through V of this Note traced the path that a plaintiff-foster
child must follow in order to hold WV DHHR and its CPS workers liable for
negligence that results in his or her abuse or neglect. While the plaintiff-foster
child could succeed in such an action, he or she would have to engage in leng-
thy, costly pre-trial litigation prior to arguing his or her claim on the merits. The
remaining parts of this Note urge the passage of legislation and argue in favor of
common law reforms that would expedite the pre-trial litigation process in cases
involving the abuse or neglect of a foster child in West Virginia.
A. Arguments Against Liability
Proponents of granting child protective services agencies-such as WV
DHHR-immunity from suits based on negligence argue that the imposition of
tort liability in such circumstances would hinder "effective governmental deci-
sion making." 276 Specifically, commentators and courts have argued that the
269 Koepf v. County of York, 251 N.W.2d 866, 869-71 (Neb. 1977) (adopting the rule that "the
discretionary-function exemption extends only to the basic policy decisions and not to ministerial
acts arising therefrom;" under this narrow definition of "discretionary function" a child protective
services agency was held liable in tort for damages that resulted from its negligent investigation of
abuse that took place in a foster home, as well as its negligent supervision of allegedly abusive
foster parents).
270 id.
271 Elton v. County of Orange, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27, 30-31 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
272 Stanley v. State Indus., Inc., 883 P.2d 793, 811-12 (Mont. 1993).
273 See supra note 254.
274 See supra parts II and Il.
275 See supra part H.
276 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 26, at 423-26; Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Ya-
muni, 529 So.2d 258, 265-66 (Fla.1988) (Overton, J., dissenting); Williams v. State, 376 N.W.2d
117, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Elliott v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 333 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. Ct.
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prospect of agency liability would encourage child welfare agencies to focus on
avoiding such liability rather than focusing on the best interests of the abused
and neglected children they are tasked with protecting. 77 Though counterintui-
tive on its face, this argument is not without merit. In some circumstances, the
prospect of liability might encourage a child welfare agency to act in an overly
aggressive manner (i.e., by removing a foster child from a safe, suitable foster
home because of a false allegation of abuse or neglect). Further, aspiring social
workers may avoid seeking employment in jurisdictions where personal liability
is a concern; 278 this argument is especially relevant in West Virginia, where low
pay, long hours, and meager benefits have already led to CPS personnel short-
falls of "crisis proportions." 279 Each of these arguments raise valid concerns, but
these concerns can be minimized through carefully calibrated legislation and
common law reform, and are, at any rate, outweighed by the positive effects of
imposing liability for negligence that proximately causes the abuse or neglect of
a foster child.
B. Arguments for Liability
Foster children are unique plaintiffs. Much like the state's prisoners
they are "no one's constituents and wield little, if any, political clout," and are
therefore in need of the most vigilant protection from the courts.2 80 The stream-
lining of the pre-trial litigation in the plaintiff-foster child's favor will serve the
goals of providing justice to a plaintiff who would otherwise not have the means
to seek redress for his or her injuries, and-perhaps more importantly-deter
such negligence in the future. When threatened with liability WV DHHR will
likely become more creative and energetic in searching for solutions to the prob-
lems identified in Parts I and II of this Note.281
At a minimum, if immunity is abrogated and liability is imposed on WV
DHHR, the agency will be given an incentive "to ensure thorough training, su-
pervision and enforcement of its guidelines-that its caseworkers thoroughly
App. 1983)); Timothy J. Courville, Government Liability for Failure to Prevent Child Abuse: A
Rationale for Absolute Immunity, 27 B.C. L. REv. 949, 980 (1986).
277 Id.
278 In re Brandon H.S., 629 S.E.2d 783, 790 (W. Va. 2006) (referring to WV DHHR staffing
levels in the eastern panhandle as having reached "crisis proportions").
279 In re Brandon Lee H.S., No. 32872, Supreme Court of Appeals of W. Va. (per curiam, Jan.
2006).
280 Riley v. Rudloff, 575 S.E.2d 377, 389 (W. Va. 2002) (quoting Ray v. McCoy, 321 S.E.2d
90, 93 (W. Va. 1984)); see also Christine M. Dine, Protecting Those Who Cannot Protect Them-
selves: State Liability for Violation of Foster Children's Right to Safety, 38 CAL. W. L. Rev. 507
(2002).
281 See generally Dine, supra note 280, at 523; Abbott, supra note 26, at 423-26.
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investigate reports of abuse and remain alert to signs that a child should be
placed in protective custody.1
282
A final, equally compelling justification for the imposition of liability in
such circumstances is that civil liability will provide compensation to the vic-
tims of WV DHHR's negligence. The compensation that the plaintiff-victim
receives would also set a precedent in which "society, rather than the injured
individual... bear[s] the cost of the state's negligence.",283 In fact, the fiscal
cost to society of imposing liability on WV DHHR would prove minimal, as the
state's liability insurance policy would have to cover any damages stemming
from WV DHHR's or a CPS worker's negligence in order for a claim to pro-
ceed.2 4
The remaining portion of this Note proposes recommendations which, if
implemented, would better serve the mutually supporting goals of providing
justice to foster children who have been abused or neglected as a result of a so-
cial worker's negligent acts or omissions, and deterring such negligence in the
future.
C. Common Law Reforms
1. Establish a Statutory Duty of Protection
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia should-at its first op-
portunity-adopt and impose upon WV DHHR and its employees a duty to act
with reasonable care285 when conducting investigations of child abuse and ne-
glect. This standard has been imposed on the West Virginia Department of Cor-
rections in executing its statutory duty to protect the state's prisoners from vio-
lence.286 The state's foster children are entitled to at least as much protection as
the state's prisoners-yet no standard has been imposed on WV DHHR in exe-
cuting its statutory duty to protect the state's foster children from harm. Though
commentators have argued that the imposition of such liability may hinder ef-
fective decision-making on WV DHHR's part, the adoption of the widely-used
"reasonable care" standard in this area would render such concerns largely
282 Abbott, supra note 26, at 426-27.
283 White v. Beasley, 552 N.W.2d 1, 22 n.51 (Mich. 1996).
2M See supra part IV. Additionally, any financial "losses" that result from the imposition of
liability in this area would probably be offset by savings in other areas. One recent national study
estimated that forty percent of foster children end up on welfare or in prison. Jill Chaifetz, Listen-
ing to Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The Failure to Serve Children in State Care,
25 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 1, 8 (1999). The same study estimated that foster children are
sixty-seven times more likely to be arrested than children who did not grow up in foster care. Id.
285 See supra notes 109-121 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 109-121 and accompanying text.
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moot, as any diligent, good faith investigation of child abuse or neglect would
likely meet the "reasonable care" standard.287
2. Deem CPS Investigations Ministerial
A majority of the jurisdictions which have addressed the issue have
deemed CPS investigations of child abuse and neglect "ministerial" in nature.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia should, at its first opportunity,
follow the majority's lead and do the same. In explicitly deeming CPS investi-
gations "ministerial," the court would eliminate the possibility that qualified
immunity might prevent a plaintiff-foster child (or any other child) from holding
a CPS worker legally liable for conducting a negligent investigation. The impo-
sition of such liability "would encourage state agency workers to be more atten-
tive in their choice of foster homes and subsequent supervision of foster care
placements. 288 It would, in short, deter negligent investigations.
D. Statutory Reform
1. BRIM Requirements
The state's current liability insurance policy almost certainly covers the
negligent acts and omissions of WV DHHR and its CPS workers. However,
BRIM negotiates a new liability insurance contract annually, and has the discre-
tion to discontinue or adjust the scope of the coverage provided to WV DHHR
in any given year. Should BRIM choose to scale back the coverage provided to
WV DHHR and its employees, a plaintiff-foster child's ability to hold WV
DHHR and its CPS workers liable for negligence that results in his or her abuse
or neglect would, under Pittsburgh Elevator, be jeopardized.
As detailed in part IV, the existence of liability insurance coverage al-
lows plaintiffs to overcome the state's sovereign immunity to suit. In contrast,
in the absence of such coverage, a plaintiff may not hold the state legally liable
in tort for monetary damages.289 Once again, a comparison between the rights
afforded to the state's prisoners and the state's foster children reveals that foster
children come up short. Section 29-12-5(a) requires BRIM to procure liability
insurance that covers all of the Department of Correction's negligent acts;29° in
287 See, e.g., Lesley v. Dept. of Soc. and Health Servs., 921 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1996) (finding
that a statute imposes a duty to investigate on social workers, and a duty to perform such investi-
gations with reasonable care exists, and that a breach of the reasonable care standard can give rise
to a cause of action in tort).
288 See Dine, supra note 280, at 523.
289 See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
290 W. Va. CODE § 29-12-5(a) provides:
In accordance with the provisions of this article, the state board of risk and in-
surance management shall provide appropriate professional or other liability
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contrast, BRIM may discontinue WV DHHR's liability insurance coverage at
any time.291 The incongruity between the rights of the state's foster children and
the state's prisoners to hold the state accountable for injuries caused by the
state's negligence is inexcusable, and should be rectified by the Legislature as
soon as possible.
Additionally, the Legislature should require BRIM to include in the
state's liability insurance policy a provision that explicitly and unambiguously
waives the state's insurer's right to assert statutory or qualified immunity when
WV DHHR or its employees are named as defendants in a negligence suit.
Such a provision would relieve a plaintiff-foster child of the burden of having to
prove that these immunities are inapplicable, and would improve the child's
odds of having his or her case adjudicated on the merits, rather than dismissed
on a technicality.
VI. CONCLUSION
WV DHHR's failures are appalling and well-documented, yet the agen-
cy's officers and employees are rarely held accountable. The state's foster chil-
dren are especially likely to pay for WV DHHR's mistakes, as numerous studies
have shown that foster children are at far higher risk of physical abuse, sexual
abuse, and neglect than children in the general population.
The best way to protect the state's foster children from such harm is to
hold WV DHHR legally liable for its mistakes. WV DHHR's employees should
be held to the widely-used "reasonable care" standard in conducting pre-
placement foster home investigations, in periodically inspecting and supervising
foster parents, and investigating reports of abuse and neglect within foster
homes. Further, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia should, at its
first opportunity, deem CPS investigations "ministerial" so that any challenge to
a plaintiff-foster child's lawsuit based on qualified immunity fails.
In order to guarantee that a plaintiff-foster child can litigate a breach of
the reasonable care standard on the merits, the Legislature should impose on the
state Bureau of Risk and Insurance Management a statutory duty to procure
liability insurance coverage for WV DHHR.
Taking these steps will not scare WV DHHR into complying with its
statutory and common law duties to protect the state's foster children. Indeed,
most of the agency's employees already undoubtedly do their best to protect the
insurance for... employees and officers of the state department of correc-
tions. Said insurance shall cover any claim, demand, action, suit or judgment
by reason of alleged negligence or other acts resulting in bodily injury or
property damage to any person within or without any... correctional institu-
tion if, at the time of the alleged injury, the ... officer of the department of
corrections was acting in the discharge of his duties, within the scope of his
office, position or employment, under the direction of the... commissioner of
corrections or in an official capacity as... commissioner of corrections.
291 See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
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children they are responsible for-and do so with extremely limited resources
and low pay. The imposition of liability, however, will spur WV DHHR to
transfer or terminate those CPS workers whose performance fails to meet the
"reasonable care" standard. The state's most vulnerable citizens will, in turn, be
better protected from abuse and neglect at the hands of the foster parents that the
state selected on their behalf.
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